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3Abstract
The paper discusses whether in view of the accumulated contextual pressures the
evolving new German employee relations model will resemble a more flexible
version of the current one or whether it will emerge as an “Anglo-Saxonised”
German model. It ascertains that despite the current contestation of the German
model, erosion tendencies, though not negligible, are not as widespread as is often
assumed and that far reaching reforms along neo-liberal lines are not desirable in the
German context. It is suggested that a large proportion of German employers have a
vested interest in maintaining the fundamentals of the current system. Proposes a
path dependent reform trajectory internal to the system. The paper shows that the
series of reforms carried-out so far has been accomplished within the parameters of
the existing system, taking the form of regulated flexibility and centrally co-ordinated
decentralisation. It ascertains that the German model is more adaptable and more
flexible than its actual reputation, allowing companies to operate with more flexible
collective employee relations’ responses. Yet, evidence suggests that firms are
already under-utilising the broadened framework. Nevertheless, the author predicts a
continuation of the reform process and an emerging new flexible German employee
relations model that remains essentially a collective one.
Keywords:   Deregulation, Decentralisation, Employee Relations, Flexibility,
Germany.
4Introduction
Against the background of heightened international competition, global shifts in
production, ongoing structural change and the problems of German unification, one
of the most controversial issues in the industrial relations (IR) literature is whether
the German model of employee relations (ER) with its emphasis on collective ER
will retain its national distinctiveness by arresting these pressures in a path dependent
trajectory of institutional and regulatory change (e.g. Lane, 1995, Whitley and
Kristensen, 1996). Alternatively, whether these pressures will lead to the
disintegration of the tightly regulated and densely institutionalised German model
and its convergence to the orthodox deregulated market-led Anglo-Saxon model with
its emphasis on individualistic ER (e.g. Streeck, 1997).
Since the early 1990s the general consensus among German employers regarding the
advantages of the German model with its proven track record seems to have
gradually weakened and subsequent erosion tendencies have increasingly contested
the German model. According to a number of commentators, the German model,
which has been extremely successful in the past, has outlived its usefulness and will
be swept away in the new millennium unless it is substantially overhauled by far
reaching reforms along neo-liberal lines in order to cater for the greater and more
diverse flexibility requirements of an increasingly heterogeneous German business
community (Berthold, 1995; Goldman Sachs, 1997). Others, however, suggest that
such an assessment overlooks the inherent internal flexible adaptation potential of the
German model to accommodate change within the parameters of the current system
(Heise, 1999, Locke, et al., 1995). The aim of this article is to shed light on the
unresolved question of whether the evolving new German model of ER will resemble
a more flexible version of the current one or whether it will emerge as an “Anglo-
Saxonised” German model.
 After setting out the salient characteristics of the German model and accounting for
its past success, the paper presents the major criticism of the German model. Based
on the available evidence, the paper goes on to assess whether the erosion of the main
institutional pillars is actually as widespread as is often assumed. Thereafter follows
5an evaluation of possible reform trajectories as to their feasibility and desirability
within the specific German context. Based on these findings, the paper analyses the
nature and extent of the reforms carried out so far. Next, it assesses in how far
companies have actually implemented the provisions of these reforms. The
concluding section draws together the main findings and maps out the possible future
direction of the emerging new German ER model. The paper focuses on the link
between labour market institutions and regulations and the micro level and sets aside
the link to macro developments.
Main Characteristics and Track Record of the German Model
The high degree of regulation and the encompassing institutional infrastructure have
imposed a uniform set of arrangements on companies but at the same time provided
an incentive structure for employers to accept institutional constraints (Lane, 1995;
Soskice, 1994). Key elements of the German model of labour relations to which a
large proportion of companies subscribe are the centrally co-ordinated sectoral
collective bargaining system and labour representation at domestic level via the
works council system, equipped with statutory information, consultation and co-
determination rights.  The traditional German approach to ER has also been
underwritten by strong labour market legislation, the close ties between companies
and banks, the comprehensive vocational education and training (VET) system, as
well as the relatively elaborate welfare system. The particular balance of constraints
and incentives generated by this interactive institutional infrastructure has resulted in
a path of upmarket restructuring across a large section of German industry (Lane,
1995; Streeck, 1992). It constrained companies from effectively operating in price
competitive markets by foreclosing a low cost adjustment route. At the same time, it
forced and enabled companies in the manufacturing sector in general, and the large
export industries in particular, to shift towards non-price competitive markets by
adopting a diversified quality production (DQP) strategy and compete on a high
skills/high productivity/high value added basis.
6Traditionally, collective bargaining has taken place between strong collectivist
unions and employers’ associations. The pilot function of the metalworking sector
settlements (covering a substantial part of the German export industries), in
combination with the co-ordination capacities of the peak organisations of capital and
labour, led to the particular German form of pattern bargaining. This created
“solidaristic” settlements, producing a high degree of standardisation of wages and
conditions, as well as ensuring that wage increases in the metalworking sector were
spread relatively evenly across the different industries in the economy. In contrast to
a decentralised bargaining system the unitary nature of the German system may have
produced less wage flexibility at the micro level. Some degree of wage structure
flexibility nonetheless exists in terms of wage differentiation between regions and
bargaining sectors, as well as inter and intra-sectoral differentiation according to
labour qualification and skills (Tüselmann, 1996a). There is traditionally no
differentiation between individual companies within a bargaining sector since the
sectoral accords apply to companies of different sizes, cost structures, technology,
capital intensity and global exposure. Indeed, the nature of the collective bargaining
system might have kept wages higher and the wage spread lower than the labour
market might have determined. Moreover, collective agreements set a de facto
minimum floor, preventing downwards pressure on pay rates and conditions, thus
taking wages and conditions largely out of competition, since the law makes it illegal
to undercut the provisions in the accords, unless they contain an explicit opening
clause. In effect, this acted as a barrier to low wage adjustment, thereby forcing
companies to orient themselves towards non-price competitive markets and adopt a
strategy of up-skilling to sustain high and relatively even wage levels (Streeck, 1992).
In turn, this required large-scale recurrent investment in training and retraining in
order to match labour productivity with the largely externally (high) fixed cost of
labour. Here, the combination of (i) the ability of the bargaining system to overcome
externalities connected to training; (ii) the comprehensive and extensive VET system
supplying a large pool of qualified labour (iii); the close links between companies
and banks shaping management orientation towards long term investment
perspectives, facilitated the high investment in human capital and technology in the
majority of German firms. In turn, this led to a high degree of functional flexibility,
enabling the adoption of a DQP strategy (Tüselmann, 1996b).
7Furthermore, strong employment protection legislation and the associated high costs
of dismissals created external labour market rigidities. To compensate, companies
were induced to seek high degrees of internal flexibility by developing large and
stable internal labour markets, which further encouraged them to invest in training
and achieve high levels of functional flexibility. This resulted in long term
employment relationships. At the domestic level, the works council system has
developed into the pivotal institution of the collective voice mechanism in German
employee relations. Despite the statutory participation rights of works councils
curtailing the scope for unilateral management decisions and strategic choice, works
council/management relations have developed into a consensual, high trust/low
conflict relationship. Works councils having taken on a co-management role and they
have operated as joint problem solving bodies by finely balancing their representative
and co-operative functions (Jacobi, et al., 1998). However, the positive experience of
the German works council system is largely contingent on the external guarantees
and features of the wider German IR context within which it embedded. For example,
the external collective bargaining system detaches management - works council
relations from the conflict over wider issues of income distribution.
This interdependent regulatory and institutional configuration which has facilitated a
high degree of functional flexibility, but constrained the pursuit of high degrees of
numerical and financial flexibility across a broad spectrum of German industries
seems to have resulted in a high wage/high productivity/high value added/high
investment matrix (Streeck 1987). The German collective approach to ER with its
emphasis on long term perspectives, co-operation, consensus and the enhancement of
joint benefits seems to be both the result as well as the underwriter of this matrix.
Additionally, the German model possesses an inherent internal reform potential to
accommodate change in an incremental, negotiated and consensual manner within
the parameters of the existing system.
Pressures for Change
8Since the early 1990s the consensus as to the benefits of the traditional collective
German approach seems to have gradually weakened. The culmination of
accumulated contextual pressures and new challenges, such as heightened
international competition, global shifts in production, ongoing structural and
technological change, as well as the problems of unification are contesting the
adaptation potential of the German model. With increased international competition
also affecting less price sensitive markets, German manufacturing companies are no
longer able to insulate themselves from price competition. Yet, firms in western
Germany have to bear the highest labour costs in the industrialised world. Labour
productivity, though high, proved insufficient to compensate for the labour cost
disadvantage, leading to German companies experiencing one the highest unit labour
costs in the industrialised world (IW, 2000a). Too high wage settlements in the 1990s
are often quoted as a main contributor (Berthold, 1995; IW 1999a) In wake of
German unification, the collective agreements on rapid wage convergence to the
western level left the eastern region grossly non-competitive. Because of the large
gap between labour cost and labour productivity, unit labour costs were significantly
above the already high western ones in the immediate post unification period
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997).
Apart from connecting the pay bargaining system with the labour cost disadvantage,
nearly every aspect of the German model is subject to criticism. As a result of the
progressive reduction of collectively agreed working hours, western German
companies have now to contend with the shortest working times in the industrialised
world. Coupled with working time laws and collective agreements, which
traditionally constrained companies pursuit of high degrees of temporal flexibility
and flexible working time arrangements, this has produced a comparatively low
degree of plant utilisation and high unit capital costs (European Commission, 1994).
Additionally, this has impeded temporal flexibility in terms of synchronisation
between fluctuations in the business cycle and working hours. Strong employment
protection legislation and restrictive laws on the conclusion of atypical contract
largely foreclosed the use of external numerical flexibility to respond to fluctuations
in demand, thereby increasing costs by carrying excess labour. The unitary and
uniform character of the wage formation system is thought to have led to wage
9settlements and structures that provided too little inter and intra-industry
differentiation. This is believed to reflect inadequately the differing flexibility
requirements of individual companies in light of the sharp intensification of
international competition for companies operating in price competitive markets and
the structural shift from manufacturing to the service sector (Kroker, 1995; Siebert,
1996). In the growing service sector, companies may require higher degrees of
temporal and numerical flexibility, as well as more a more differentiated wage
structure to reflect the relative importance of lower skilled jobs in this diverse sector.
Erosion of the German Model: Myth and Reality
The upshot of the above developments is assumed to have led to a serious erosion of
all the main institutional pillars of the German model (Hassel, 1999; Schnabel, 1998;
Wirtschaftswoche, 1995). According to such commentators, there has been a wave of
resignations from employers associations, a large decline in the importance of
sectoral bargaining, a steep increase in company level bargaining, a declining works
council ratio and a steadily increasing incidence of disorganised decentralisation,
whereby employers which remain in sectoral bargaining structures violate the
provisions in the collective agreements.
However, on closer inspection it appears that pressures and erosion, though not
negligible, are by no means as overwhelming as often portrayed. It would be
misleading to attribute the surge in western German labour costs in the 1990s (apart
from the wage settlements in the immediate post unification period) mainly to the
German wage formation system. The main reason for the increase was not so much
the disproportionate growth in direct wage costs as compared to other main industrial
countries, but rather the faster rise in non-wage labour costs, especially the increasing
social security element, rather than the collectively agreed pay supplements (IW,
2000b). Indeed, throughout the 1990s, wage restraint continued to be an essential
feature of the German model, with wage increases being generally below the so-
called ‘cost-neutral margin of distribution’ - which is the increase in inflation plus the
increase in labour productivity (Heise, 1999). In eastern Germany, the unit labour
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cost disadvantage has continually been reduced, partly because of rationalisation and
the revision of the wage convergence agreements, although they are still above those
in western Germany (IW 1999b)
There are no official statistics on the coverage rate of the major IR institutions,
making it impossible to exactly quantify the degree of erosion. However, on balance,
the various studies suggest that membership to employers’ associations may have
fallen between 8 and 12 percentage points in the private sector in western Germany
since the early 1990s (Hassel, 1999; Schulten and Zagelmeyer, 1998), This institution
nonetheless remains relatively encompassing with around three quarters of
companies still subscribing to employers associations by the end of the 1990s (EIRR,
2000). Accordingly, the percentage of companies subject to sectoral bargaining
accord decreased, though these still applied to over two-thirds of west German
employees in 1999 (EIRR, 2000). Despite the number of company level agreements
having doubled in the 1990/99 period (IW, 2000c), their relative importance should
not overrated. The growth was mainly accounted for by SMEs and company level
agreements covered under 8 per cent of all private sector employees in 1999 (IW,
2000c). A growing incidence of companies concluding individual agreements with
employees also accounts for the decline in the coverage rate of sectoral agreements
(Schnabel, 1998).  However, the main reason for the decline in membership of
employers’ association and the coverage of sectoral accords lies not in a wave of
resignations from employers’ associations but can mainly be explained by newly
established companies, many of which are service sector companies and often
relatively small in size, having not joined employers’ associations (IAB, 1998). This
also explains a decreasing works council ratio, albeit around two-thirds of employees
still work in establishments which have this collective voice mechanism (Addison, et
al., 1998). Additionally, every second firm which withdrew from the sectoral
bargaining structure and opted for company level bargaining rejoined their respective
employers’ association after one year (IW, 1999c). It should be noted that companies
which withdrew from employers’ associations account for just 4 per cent of the
dependent labour force in western Germany (Schulten and Zagelmeyer, 1998).
In summary, it would appear that the main pillars of the German model remain
relatively encompassing and the overwhelming majority of companies who subscribe
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to them are not abandoning them, but newly founded companies, especially in the
service sector are not subscribing to them. With the lower degree of collective
arrangements in the service sector not being a German specific, but an international
development, a certain decline in the importance of the collective ER institutions in
the German economy (like in other developed countries) is more or less expected in
line with of the growth of the service sector. Rather than employers being dissatisfied
with the German model, the structural shift seems to be the main explanatory factor,
negating to a large extent the notion that German firms are withdrawing from the
system en masse.
Notwithstanding the above, there has been a growing incidence of disorganised
decentralisation since the early 1990s, whereby employers who subscribe to the
sectoral bargaining system undercut the provisions in collective agreements (despite
being illegal), either unilaterally or in co-operation with works councils (Bispinck,
1998; Jacobi, et.al. 1998), thereby exerting considerable pressure onto the sectoral
parties to arrest this trend in the form of organised decentralisation. In west Germany,
this development relates mainly to issues of working time flexibility, but is also
becoming more prominent in relation to pay, with the latter being accounted for
mainly by SMEs. Yet, larger German companies are also increasingly securing such
deals with their works councils by inserting the strategic use of DFI and the threat of
locational flexibility in the management/works council relationship (Mueller, 1996).
Furthermore, erosion tendencies are more prominent in east Germany than in the
western region (e.g. Schmidt, 1998, Wirtschaftswoche, 1995). A considerable
number of companies have either not joined or withdrawn from the sectoral
bargaining structures and in those that remain within these structures, disorganised
decentralisation, especially in relation to pay, is substantially more pronounced than
in west Germany. There may be a danger that this feeds back to the western region,
thereby potentially undermining the system as whole.
Trajectory of Change
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Although the need for reforms is widely accepted, the unresolved issue is how and to
what extent to reform a model that has proven extremely successful in the past
without losing its advantages. Indeed, the real issue is not one of a duality of choice
between preserving the status quo and far reaching deregulation/decentralisation
measures along the lines of the market-led Anglo-Saxon model. This is true
particularly true when it is considered that it is impossible to provide a framework
within which companies in all types of markets, industries and sectors can operate
under optimal conditions (see McDonald and Tüselmann, 1998). In fact, Anglo-
Saxon style reforms may prove detrimental in the German context. Far reaching
deregulation and decentralisation measures may perhaps improve the conditions for
companies which operate in price sensitive markets by considerably enhancing the
scope to achieve high degrees of numerical and pay flexibility, but this may destroy
the very incentive structure that forced and enabled a large section of German
industry to effectively compete in less price sensitive markets on a high value added,
high productivity, high skills bases, underpinned by high degrees of functional
flexibility. This is contingent on the particular configuration of certain rigidities, such
as strong employment protection laws, a relatively undifferentiated wage structure
and pay settlements. Thus, a large proportion of German employers actually has a
vested interest in maintaining the fundamentals of the German model.  The
elimination of these rigidities may lead to widespread opportunistic behaviour and
opening the floodgates to a low cost adjustment route which in the long run propel
the German high wage/high value added/high productivity/high investment matrix to
a low wage/low value added/low productivity/low investment matrix.
Nevertheless, it should be possible to broaden the scope for differentiation;
numerical, temporal and pay flexibility and widening the margin for company
specific solutions to a certain extent without endangering the basis of the German
model. This implies a trajectory of internal reforms within the parameters of
adaptation potential of the current system, taking the form of regulated flexibility and
centrally co-ordinated decentralisation. This would allow companies to operate with
a more flexible collective ER approach. The framework for numerical flexibility may
be broadened somewhat without a significant curtailment of the employment
protection regulations by liberalising the conclusion of atypical contracts. At the
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same time, safeguards need to be included to limit the possibility of utilising such
contracts as a means of circumventing dismissal protection legislation. In contrast, it
should be possible to widen considerably the scope for working time flexibility, as
long as sectoral agreements continue to set the minima within which management
and works councils can negotiate company specific solutions. Temporal flexibility is
another source of internal flexibility and is therefore complementary to the high
degree of functional flexibility found in many German companies.
Yet, far reaching reforms to the wage formation system (the core of German
industrial relations), whereby the feasible space for the pursuit of high degrees of
financial flexibility is substantially enlarged, is not a viable alternative in the German
context. The radical decentralisation option of a full-scale move to
company/establishment level bargaining would undermine the incentive structure that
has underpinned the widespread upmarket restructuring across a broad spectrum of
industries. In any case, a general move to company/establishment bargaining would
be accompanied by a shift in relative bargaining power between the parties to the
disadvantage of employers and SMEs especially, since they would have to negotiate
with unions that are organised on a sectoral basis. Amending the law to allow works
councils to engage in pay bargaining would destroy the harmonious high trust/low
conflict relationship between management and work councils, since this is largely the
result of their relations being detached from the wider issues of income distribution.
The bulk of German employers actually have a vested interest in maintaining the
fundamentals of the current system. Because of the pilot function of the
metalworking sector, the anti-inflation stance of the Bundesbank and the co-
ordination capacities of the peak organisations of labour and capital, the settlements
in the engineering sector are generally in line with the existing rate of inflation and
economy wide productivity growth1. With labour productivity generally being higher
in most export industries compared to manufacturing as a whole and with labour
productivity growth in manufacturing generally being above economy wide labour
productivity growth (Heise, 1999; Hof, 1995), wage restraint is a an essential feature
                                                          
1 With the European Central Bank having taken over responsibility for monetary policy, it may be
somewhat questionable whether the effect on collective bargaining in Germany may be as strong as
under the Bundesbank reign.
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of the system. This wage restraint works obviously to the advantage of a large
proportion of German employers, over and above the benefits of lower bargaining,
conflict and transaction costs when compared to a decentralised bargaining situation.
Furthermore, independent of industry and sector, sectoral agreements reflect average
productivity and profitability of all firms in the bargaining sector, thus rewarding
firms with above average productivity. Both lines of argument explain why the
majority of firms have a vested interest in having large parts of pay determined
outside the company level. This is particularly true against the background of the
large proportion of high skills/high productivity workers in many German companies.
These employees have substantial bargaining power. By determining a large part of
pay externally, the sectoral bargaining system prevents the appropriation of quasi-
rents by employees. Decentralisation in relation to pay would need to be closely
defined so that it is not too extensive in scope and includes safeguards to prevent
opportunistic behaviour by individual firms and widespread low wage cost
adjustment strategies, which would undermine the incentives to compete on high
skills/high productivity/high value added basis.
In sum, reforms would need to strike a subtle balance between making the German
model more flexible, thus allowing more differentiated solutions in accordance with
the specific needs of companies, whilst maintaining the fundamentals and advantages
of the current system. Consequently, such a reform path implies that there are limits
to greater flexibility in the German context.
The Reform Process
The assessment of the series of reforms throughout the 1990s shows that by the new
Millennium the German model appears to be more adaptable and more flexible than
its actual reputation. In relation to numerical flexibility, deregulation by the state has
been modest (for an overview see e.g. Heise, 2000; Tüselmann, 1996a). Despite
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some easing of redundancy provisions, government deregulation measures have not
led to significant curtailment of the General Dismissal Protection Act. However, the
scope for flexible staffing has been improved by the liberalisation of the conclusion
of fixed term contracts2 and the relaxation of regulations on work through temporary
work agencies. However, at the same time, safeguards were included to limit the
possibility of utilising such atypical employment as a means of circumventing
dismissal protection legislation. Legislation concerning part-time employment was
aimed at enhancing the conditions for the uptake of part-time jobs by improving
social security provision, rather than using deregulation measures. In fact, all these
measures took the form of regulated flexibility and have not impaired the
configuration of rigidities, which underpin the widespread pursuit of high skill/high
productivity/high value added approaches in Germany. Companies in less price
sensitive markets, but where there has been an increase in the competitive
environment, should be able to enhance numerical flexibility via flexible staffing at
the edges of their internal labour markets without undermining the incentive structure
for pursuing high degrees of functional flexibility. The flexibility requirements of
companies operating in price competitive markets and the service sector should have
been met to some extent.
The new Working Time Law, which replaced the outdated and restrictive Working
Time Order of 1938 has considerably broadened the framework for flexible working
time arrangements and has given the social partners a wide margin of manoeuvre.
Indeed, the flexibilisation of the sectoral bargaining system has been given a
substantial boost by the various agreements on flexible working hours during the
1990s (for an overview of the reforms see e.g. Tüselmann and Heise, 2000; WSI,
1998).  Over recent years, it has become commonplace for collective agreements on
working time to include opening clauses that allow the local level parties to deviate
from the collectively agreed provisions in order to reflect the specific needs of
individual companies/establishments. Notwithstanding inter-sectoral differences,
many collective agreements allow for the annualization of working time, variation
and differentiation between companies, plants/branches, employee groups, etc. This
                                                          
2 The legislation for the liberalisation of fixed term contracts runs out by end of the year 2000 and no
extension has been agreed to as yet.
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has been achieved by means such as work-sharing agreements (e.g. banking, printing,
steel and metalworking industries), working time corridors (e.g. insurance, textile,
western German chemical and eastern German synthetics industries), the extension of
standard working time (subject to upper limits) (e.g., metalworking industries) and
increasing the averaging-out period for the unequal distribution of working time.
Many collective accords now also allow for individual time-banking and in several
industries additional flexibility exists, such as the inclusion of Saturdays in the
calculation of the normal working time.
So far, the reforms have been achieved within the adaptation potential of the existing
collective bargaining system, taking the form of centrally controlled decentralisation.
The sectoral level parties determine the extent, limits and implementation
procedures, within which domestic level parties can negotiate
company/establishment specific solutions. The expanded range for temporal
flexibility should enable companies in all types of markets, industries and sectors to
operate with a lower cost base at the German location. It allows for quicker response
to fluctuations in demand and a better synchronisation between business cycle
developments and working time without having to resort to more expensive options,
such as lay-offs, overtime and short-time working. Indeed, a higher degree of
temporal flexibility should reduce the need for high levels of numerical flexibility to
meet companies' short-term flexibility requirements. Furthermore, companies can
improve long-term competitiveness by reducing capital unit costs via more flexible
working time arrangements, which allows for the de-coupling of individual working
time and plant operation time/opening hours.
In contrast to working time flexibility, reforms in pay bargaining, though gaining
momentum, have generally been more selective, more closely defined, less extensive
in scope, provided greater control for the central level parties and are more likely to
include safeguards to circumvent widespread opportunistic behaviour (for an
overview of the reforms see e.g. Schnabel, 1998, Tüselmann and Heise, 2000). As
outlined before, an overly broad scope for pay differentiation and flexibility may not
be desirable in the German context. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, progress has
been made in inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral horizontal differentiation, as well as in
vertical differentiation in terms of wage structure flexibility. There has been a
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widening of the wage spread since the mid 1990s with pay accords producing a wider
differential in collectively agreed pay increases and supplements between the
bargaining sector. Although the pilot function of the metalworking sector seems still
to be intact, the margin of fluctuation around the pilot settlements has widened
somewhat recently (WSI 2000), thereby producing pay increases which are more
sensitive to the different economic conditions among the different industries in the
economy. Wage structure flexibility has been increased in several bargaining sectors
(e.g. chemical, paper, construction industries), incorporating additional rates at the
bottom of the pay scale or lower starting salaries for new labour market entrants and
the long term unemployed.
However, the main emphasis in the reform process has been to incorporate opening
clauses in the sectoral accords, increasing intra-sectoral differentiation. The different
types of opening clauses allow companies to conclude agreements with the works
councils to postpone, waive or lower collectively agreed pay rates or supplements for
a limited period of time and to a certain extent. Some opening clauses are explicitly
linked to companies experiencing severe economic difficulties, such as the hardship
clauses in the plastics and travel industries, the eastern German steel and
metalworking industries and the western German paper industry. However, opening
clauses that are not explicitly linked to the potential threat of bankruptcy have
become more common over recent years. Opening clauses are either conditional
ones, whereby agreements between works councils and management require the
consent of the sectoral parties (e.g. western German chemical industry and eastern
German construction industry) or unconditional ones where no consent is needed.
Many of both types of opening clause contain provisions for job security and/or
require an undertaking by the employer to improve competitiveness at the German
location. Furthermore, in several bargaining sectors, small company clauses have
been agreed, such as in the eastern German retailing and wholesaling industries and
the western German brewery industry. These clauses provide for agreements between
management and works councils in companies below a certain size threshold to
undercut collectively agreed provisions.
These reforms have made the sectoral pay agreements more flexible by providing
greater inter-company differentiation within bargaining sectors and by widening the
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space for firms to create downwards pay flexibility. So far, decentralisation has been
embedded within the existing structure of the system. The conflict over wider issues
of income distribution is still conducted at central level, with collective agreements
continuing to set minimum conditions, while at the same time broadening the
framework for company specific solutions without undermining the incentive
structure for the pursuit of high skills/high productivity approaches.
Implementation Record of the Reforms
However, the available evidence on the implementation of the reforms suggests that
companies, despite calls for further reforms, are only making limited use of the
existing broadened framework for differentiation and flexibility. Once sectoral and
socio-economic developments and business cycle developments are discounted, the
diffusion effect of the reforms appears smaller than might have been anticipated.
Despite a marginal increase, fixed term employment has remained relatively stable
since the mid 1980s and still lies below the EU average (IW, 2000d). Interestingly, by
the year 2000, the share of fixed term contracts on all employment contracts is lower
in a number of the service sector industries, such as banking and insurance or other
business services compared to the average share of the private sector as a whole (IW,
2000d). Although experiencing a dynamic growth rate, studies suggest that the level
of part-time employment remains below its full potential (e.g. McKinsey, 1994).
Additionally, compared to the share of part-time employment in other OECD
countries, Germany occupies only a middle position (OECD, 2000).
It is impossible to ascertain exactly the uptake of the opening clauses in the sectoral
agreements on pay and working time flexibility because of the lack of comprehensive
data. However, there are indications that fewer companies than expected are making
full use them (see e.g. Handelsblatt, 1997; Gewerkschaftliche Umschau, 1997;
Tüselmann, 1996b, WSI, 1998). For example, just 5 per cent of chemical companies
which are subject to the sectoral accords have implemented of the provision on a
working time corridor, less than 10 per cent of companies in the metalworking sector
seem to have implemented the work-sharing agreements and just 3 per cent of
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chemical firms are estimated to utilise the pay corridor provisions or the lower
starting salary provisions.
One explanation offered for the under-utilised framework is that the scope has not
been broadened enough (Hassel, 1999). Another reason put forward is that increased
information and transaction costs arising from the complexities of the
implementation and adaptation provisions in the sectoral accords may outweigh the
benefits of greater flexibility, especially for SMEs (Schnabel, 1995). Both lines of
arguments may partially explain the increase in informal flexibility via disorganised
decentralisation despite the broadened formal scope for differentiation and flexibility.
Alternatively, in light of the high degree of functional flexibility in many German
firms, the current provisions might already be more than sufficient to cater for the
flexibility requirements of a large section of German companies. In this context the
need for further reforms seems somewhat debatable. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the growing incidence of disorganised decentralisation and informal
flexibility will probably lead to a further broadening of the formal framework since
the sectoral parties are anxious to arrest this trend within the parameters of the
current system.
Conclusions
Despite the problems in the German ER model, it is not on the brink of collapse.
These problems are not negligible, but they are by no means as overwhelming as
often portrayed. Although there is a decline in the coverage rate of the main ER
institutions (albeit still remaining relatively encompassing), the decline is largely due
to structural shifts rather than a widespread withdrawal from the German model.
However, a growing incidence of disorganised decentralisation and informal
flexibility, as well as the situation in East Germany are contesting the German model.
Although the need for reforms is widely accepted, the foregoing analyses has shown
that many German employers have actually a vested interest in maintaining the
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fundamentals of the current model and that far reaching deregulation and
decentralisation measures along the lines of the market-led Anglo-Saxon model are
not a viable option in the German context. This would destroy the very incentive
structure that underpins the high skills/high productivity/high value added
approaches found in may German companies, particularly in the export industries,
since this is dependent on the particular configuration of regulatory and institutional
rigidities created by the German system. Yet, it should be possible to make the
German model more flexible and provide a wider margin for company specific
solutions without endangering the fundamentals of the German model. This could be
achieved by a path dependent reform trajectory within the parameters of the
adaptation potential of the current system, taking the form of regulated flexibility and
centrally controlled decentralisation in order to better reflect the differing flexibility
requirements of an increasingly diverse German business community.
Indeed, the assessment of the reforms carried out so far has revealed that these have
been accomplished within the parameters of the existing system and that the reform
process seems actually more advanced than frequently assumed. This indicates that
the German model is more adaptable and more flexible than its actual reputation,
allowing companies to operate with more flexible collective ER responses.
Nevertheless, evidence on the implementation of these reforms at the company level
suggests that firms are already under-utilising the enhanced framework for
differentiation, flexibility and strategic choice. This perhaps suggests that the reforms
so far are either already more than sufficient to cater for the flexibility requirements
of a large section of German companies, or have not been broad enough in scope and
have therefore led to disorganised decentralisation and the pursuit of informal
flexibility.
Notwithstanding the under-utilised framework, the reform process is set to continue.
However, this raises the question how far it should go and where to draw the line to
stop it from threatening the existence of the current model. In light of the
impossibility of providing a framework whereby companies in all types of markets,
industries and sectors can operate under optimal conditions, the limits of a path
dependent reform process will be reached when it starts to undermine the incentive
structure that enables a large section of Germany industry to compete effectively in
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less price sensitive markets with a DQP strategy. This therefore rules out “Anglo-
Saxonisation” style measures. Because of the continuing pressures of disorganised
decentralisation and informal flexibility such an outcome may not seem entirely clear
at this particular juncture of time. Nevertheless, the emerging flexible German ER
model, should be able to embrace the service sector and the eastern German business
community to a greater extent, whilst at the same time leaving the incentive structure
for its core constituency intact, i.e. the western German manufacturing sector, in
general, and the large export industries, which continue to be the backbone of the
German economy, in particular. There are strong grounds to assume that past success
will set the future direction of the evolving new German ER model, by striking a
subtle balance between change and continuity.
To further substantiate these conjectures, future research needs to obtain a more
comprehensive empirical picture of the erosion tendencies, especially in eastern
Germany, and the implementation of reforms at the micro level. Furthermore, cross-
national research needs to assess the findings and arguments of this paper in light of
the experience in other countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Additionally
the findings and arguments of the paper need to be integrated into the theoretical
frameworks and empirical evidence of the different strands of the convergence
debate.
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